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1.  Introduction 
Due to advances in mathematical modeling capabilities, simulation models of Cournot 
competition in electricity markets are gaining increasing attention. Such simulation 
models are being applied to the electricity markets in some countries to support policy 
decisions on market design, market monitoring, and other regulatory tasks.   
However, there have been few simulation analyses of Cournot competition in the 
Japanese electricity market. Akiyama and Hosoe (2006) conduct a simulation of 
perfect competition in the Japanese electricity market. Hattori (2003) examines 
Cournot competition in the Western region of Japan, while Hasuike and Kanemoto 
(2005) investigate Cournot competition in the Eastern region of Japan. However, 
Hattori, and Hasuike and Kanemoto do not consider transmission constraints explicitly 
in their models. 
One of the challenges in Cournot modeling of electricity markets has been the 
inclusion of transmission constraints. Hobbs and Helman (2004) argue that there are 
two approaches to modeling Cournot generators on transmission networks. One 
approach is to assume that generators can manipulate transmission charges. The other 
approach is to assume that generators cannot consciously manipulate transmission 
charges. 
Cardel et al. (1997), Borenstein and Bushnell (1999), Borenstein et al. (2000), and 
Hobbs et al. (2000) examine the former approach in detail. Tanaka (2006) applies this 
approach to evaluation of the Japanese electricity market. In these models, 
sophisticated generators can correctly predict the effects of their decisions on 
transmission charges. These models are formulated as equilibrium problems with 
equilibrium constraints (EPEC). The disadvantage of this approach is that each 
generator’s maximization problem is highly nonconvex and difficult to solve. There 
may be no equilibrium or multiple equilibria.   
The latter approach is examined by Smeers and Jing-Yuan (1997), Hobbs (2001), 
and Metzler et al. (2003). In these models, generators are naive with respect to how 
their generation choices will affect transmission congestion and charges. In other 
words, this approach adopts the Bertrand assumption in the transmission market. The 
Bertrand assumption means that generators consider transmission charges as being 
exogenous, which can be interpreted as a kind of bounded rationality. The advantage of 
this approach is that we can formulate mixed complementarity problems (MCP) that 
have a unique solution.   
In this paper, we adopt the latter approach, following Hobbs (2001): that is, the   3
Cournot assumption in the energy market and the Bertrand assumption in the 
transmission market. Using a linear complementarity approach, we then simulate the 
Japanese wholesale electricity market, considering eight areas linked by 
interconnection transmission lines. Specifically, this paper examines the potential 
effects of both investment in interconnection transmission lines and the divestiture of 
dominant players’ power plants. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a 
model of a transmission-constrained Cournot market. In Section 3, we present the 
simulation results of the Japanese wholesale electricity market. Section 4 summarizes 
our results. 
 
2.  The Model 
 
2.1  DC Network Model 
We consider an electric power network with nodes  N n , , 1K =   and transmission lines 
L l , , 1K = . The transmission capacity of each line is denoted by the vector 
)' , , (
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injection at node  n.  
We consider the DC load flow approximation (see, for example, Schweppe et al., 
1988 for details), focusing on the network where transmission losses are small and 
negligible. The power flow on transmission line l , ) (q
l F , can be expressed as a 
linear function of the net injection  ) , (
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total and marginal cost of power generation at node  n, respectively.   
 
                                                  
1  A bold symbol represents a vector or a matrix.  a′  denotes the transpose of  a . 
2  As is customary in the electric power engineering literature,  n l h ,   represents the increase in the power 
flow on line  l   resulting from a unit increase in the power transferred from node  n   to the swing bus.     4
2.2  Cournot Generators 
Following Hobbs (2001), we adopt the Cournot assumption in the energy market and 
the Bertrand assumption in the transmission market. In other words, generators have 
market power in the energy market, but cannot consciously manipulate congestion and 
transmission charges. The Bertrand assumption means that generators consider 
transmission charges as being exogenous, which can be interpreted as a kind of 
bounded rationality.   
Let 
n w  denote the withdrawal charge at node n . Generators pay the system 
operator a withdrawal charge 
n w  to withdraw power at node n . In contrast, 
generators get 
n w  (pay 
n w − ) when they inject power at node  n. Note that one has 
to pay the system operator 
m n w w + −  in order to transmit power from node  n to 
node  m  (i.e., inject power at node n  and withdraw it at node m ). Thus, 
m n w w + −  can be seen as the transmission charge (or wheeling charge). We assume 
that 
n w   is exogenous for generators.   
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which is decomposed into the power demand at node  n and the power demand at 
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For notational simplicity, we here assume that there is one Cournot generator at 
each node. Then, the profit maximization problem of Cournot generator  n can be 
stated as follows:   
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Equation ( 3 ) can be rewritten as 
m n n m w w P P + − = − . In other words, the energy 
price difference between any two nodes is exactly equal to the transmission charge   5
between them; that is, there are no arbitrage opportunities.   
 
2.3  System Operator 
An efficient power market is characterized by the maximization of the social welfare 
subject to the energy balance and transmission capacity constraints. Since the total 
power generated during any given hour has to be equal to the total amount demanded, 
the energy balance constraint can be written as  0 ) , (
, , = ∑
n
d n s n n q q Q . Moreover, the 
transmission capacity constraint can be expressed as 
l l k F ≤ | ) ( | q , because the power 
flow on each line cannot exceed the line’s capacity. Note that we take the absolute 
value of  ) (q
l F   considering the direction of the power flow.   
The system operator solves the following maximization problem:   
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Let  λ  be the shadow price associated with the energy balance constraint. Let 
0 , ≥
− + l l η η   be the shadow prices associated with the transmission capacity constraints. 
Considering those nodes at which  0
, >
d n q , the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) 
conditions with respect to 
d n q
,  yield the standard nodal pricing formulas: 
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λ   is usually called the system price, which is a uniform energy price over all nodes. 
Based on the standard nodal pricing method, the withdrawal charge at node  n can 
be defined as the difference between the nodal price at node  n and the system price;   6
that is,  ( ) ∑
+ − − = − ≡
l
l l n l d n n n h q P w η η λ
, , ) ( . Note that 
n w   depends on the degree of 
congestion in the network, and hence 
− + l l η η , . 
 
2.4  Solution Approach 
We assume that the inverse demand functions and marginal cost functions are linear. 
Moreover, note that the power flow equations can be expressed as linear functions of 
the net injection, as mentioned in subsection 2.1. Thus, the KKT conditions for the 
generators’ and system operator’s maximization problems define a mixed linear 
complementarity problem (LCP).
3 This mixed LCP can be solved numerically using 
solvers such as PATH and MILES. 
 
3.  Simulation Analysis 
 
3.1  Simulation Setup 
We analyze the Japanese electricity market of eight incumbent electric power 
companies. Figure 1 shows the market areas of the incumbent firms and the 
interconnection transmission lines between the areas. We consider each area as a node 
in the network.
4 The supply capability and peak load for fiscal year 2001 are 
summarized in Table 1.
5 The capacity of each interconnection transmission line is 
shown in Table 2.   
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
Our analysis focuses on the peak period. We estimate linear demand and marginal 
cost functions using publicly available data for fiscal year 2001. Following Hasuike 
                                                  
3  We can formulate a mixed LCP, in which the number of conditions equals the number of variables, by 
rearranging the conditions and eliminating redundant conditions. 
4  The system operation within each area is not considered in our simulation. 
5 The supply capability includes the power output of relatively small electric utilities other than the 
eight incumbent electric power companies; for example, hydroelectric power generated by municipal 
electric utilities and Electric Power Development Co., Ltd., and nuclear power generated by Japan 
Atomic Power Co., Ltd. We consider the power plants of these electric utilities as must-run plants in our 
simulation.    7
and Kanemoto (2005), we set the price elasticity of demand and the reference price at 
0.1 and 10 yen/kWh, respectively, for all areas. The load is set at the maximum 
three-day average peak load in each area. Then, a linear demand function is calibrated 
for each area. We next estimate a linear marginal cost function for each incumbent 
electric power company, using power plant data such as the amount of fuel burned, the 
fuel consumption rate, and fuel prices. The basic parameters are summarized in Table 
3.  
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
About 35% of all electricity demand, mainly household consumption, is still 
regulated in Japan. We consider regulated demand as an exogenous variable in our 
simulation. Note also that throughout this paper we focus on the short-term welfare and 
do not discuss the issue of fixed cost. 
 
3.2  Base Case: Cournot Competition among Eight Incumbent Generators   
We perform a simulation of Cournot competition among the eight incumbent 
generators, which we refer to as the base case. Figure 2 summarizes the results of this 
base case simulation. The transmission capacity of the interconnection line between 
area B and area C, namely line 2, is very limited. Under Cournot competition, line 2 is 
heavily congested from area C to area B, which divides the market into the Eastern and 
Western regions. This results in a significant price difference between the two regions: 
the energy prices are 19.23 yen/kWh and 12.80 yen/kWh in the Eastern and Western 
regions, respectively.   
 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
 
Figure 3 compares the energy prices under Cournot competition with those under 
perfect competition. The congestion on Line 2 is much less severe under perfect 
competition than under Cournot competition. Indeed, the price difference between the 
two regions is very small under perfect competition: the energy prices are 7.46 
yen/kWh and 7.31 yen/kWh in the Eastern and Western regions, respectively.   
 
 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
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Figure 4 compares the quantities generated under Cournot competition with those 
under perfect competition. Under Cournot competition, the quantities produced in 
areas B, C, and E are decreased, while those produced in the other five areas are 
increased.  
 
[Insert Figure 4 about here] 
 
The welfare comparisons are reported in Table 4. Under Cournot competition, 
consumer surplus decreases by 880 million yen/h, while producer surplus increases by 
793 million yen/h; congestion revenue increases by 8 million yen/h; and social surplus 
decreases by 80 million yen/h, which is the welfare (deadweight) loss in the Cournot 
market. 
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
3.3  Effects of Upgrading Transmission Capacity 
We analyze the effects of upgrading the bottleneck transmission line, namely line 2. 
Figure 5 shows the price changes due to the upgrading of line 2’s capacity up to 
7,200MW. The price difference between the two regions becomes smaller as the 
capacity of line 2 increases: the energy price in the Eastern region falls, while that in 
the Western region rises. However, note that the capacity of the interconnection line 
between area C and area E, namely line 3, becomes congested when line 2’s capacity 
reaches to about 3,600MW. 
 
[Insert Figure 5 about here] 
 
Table 5 reports the welfare changes due to the upgrading of line 2’s capacity. 
Consumer surplus rises and producer surplus falls as the capacity of line 2 increases. 
By upgrading line 2’s capacity to 7,200MW, social surplus increases by 11 million 
yen/h as compared to that in the base case. Note that we focus on the short-term 
welfare, and the issue of capacity cost is not discussed here.   
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
Figures 6, 7, and 8 summarize the results of upgrading the capacity on line 2 to 
2,400MW, 4,800MW, and 7,200MW, respectively.   9
 
[Insert Figure 6 about here] 
 
[Insert Figure 7 about here] 
 
[Insert Figure 8 about here] 
 
3.4  Effects of Divestiture 
We examine the effects of the divestiture of generating plants by incumbent electric 
power companies. Five hypothetical divestiture scenarios are discussed:   
Scenario I: firm B is split into two companies. 
Scenario II: firm B is split into three companies. 
Scenario III: firm B is split into four companies. 
Scenario IV: firms A, B, C, and E are respectively split into two companies. 
Scenario V: firm B is split into six companies; firms A, C, and E are each split 
into two companies. 
As illustrated in Figure 9, the divestiture of firm B, the largest generator, has the 
significant effect of mitigating market power. The energy price in the Eastern region 
falls from 19.23 yen/kWh to 14.45 yen/kWh in Scenario I, since the Eastern region 
becomes more competitive. Moreover, the energy price in the Eastern region falls to 
12.79 yen/kWh in Scenario II, in which case the congestion on line 2 is relieved and 
the price difference between the two regions disappears. In Scenario III, the direction 
of the power flow on line 2 reverses due to increasing competition in the Eastern 
region. The welfare results are reported in Table 6. In comparison with the base case, 
the increases in consumer surplus are 208, 286, and 338 million yen/h in Scenarios I, II, 
and III, respectively. The increases in social surplus are 39, 49, and 52 million yen/h in 
Scenarios I, II, and III, respectively. 
 
[Insert Figure 9 about here] 
 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
In Scenarios IV and V, we further consider the divestiture of firms A, C, and E. 
Particularly in Scenario V, the energy prices in both regions fall to 10.96 yen/kWh due 
to increasing competition in the two regions. Note that the congestion on line 2 is 
relieved and the price difference between the two regions disappears as in Scenario II.   10
As compared to the base case, the increases in consumer surplus are 327 and 518 
million yen/h in Scenarios IV and V, respectively. The increases in social surplus are 
51 and 68 million yen/h in Scenarios IV and V, respectively. 
The results of divestiture Scenarios I to V are summarized in figures 10 to 14, 
respectively. 
 
[Insert Figure 10 about here] 
 
[Insert Figure 11 about here] 
 
[Insert Figure 12 about here] 
 
[Insert Figure 13 about here] 
 
[Insert Figure 14 about here] 
 
4.  Concluding Remarks 
Following Hobbs (2001), we have adopted the Cournot assumption in the energy 
market and the Bertrand assumption in the transmission market, in which generators 
consider transmission charges as being exogenous. By using a linear complementarity 
approach, we have then simulated the Japanese wholesale electricity market, 
considering eight areas linked by interconnection transmission lines. Specifically, this 
paper has examined the potential effects of both investment in interconnection 
transmission lines and the divestiture of dominant players’ power plants.   
Under Cournot competition among the eight incumbent generators, the 
interconnection line between area B and area C, namely line 2, is heavily congested 
from area C to area B, which divides the market into the Eastern and Western regions. 
This results in a significant price difference between the two regions: the energy prices 
are 19.23 yen/kWh and 12.80 yen/kWh in the Eastern and Western regions, 
respectively. 
We have next analyzed the effects of upgrading the bottleneck transmission line, 
namely line 2. The price difference between the two regions becomes smaller as the 
capacity of line 2 increases: the energy price in the Eastern region falls, while that in 
the Western region rises. However, the capacity of the interconnection line between 
area C and area E, namely line 3, becomes congested when line 2’s capacity reaches 
about 3,600MW.   11
We have then examined the effects of the divestiture of generating plants by 
incumbent electric power companies. The energy price in the Eastern region falls from 
19.23 yen/kWh to 14.45 yen/kWh in Scenario I (firm B is split into two companies), 
since the Eastern region becomes more competitive. Moreover, the energy price in the 
Eastern region falls to 12.79 yen/kWh in Scenario II (firm B is split into three 
companies), in which case the congestion on line 2 is relieved and the price difference 
between the two regions disappears. In Scenario III (firm B is split into four 
companies), the direction of the power flow on line 2 reverses due to increasing 
competition in the Eastern region. The divestiture of firm B, the largest generator, has 
the significant effect of mitigating market power. 
In this work, we have considered an electric power network where transmission 
losses are small and negligible. Further work should aim to incorporate transmission 
losses into the model. With regard to the transmission constraints, we have focused on 
the thermal limit of each line. Further work is needed to incorporate other realistic 
constraints such as limits on voltage and stability. Another avenue for future research is 
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Table 1. Supply Capability and Peak Load (2001) 
Unit: MW
ABCDEFGH T o t a l
Supply capability 17,383 62,375 31,194 6,794 33,163 13,383 7,203 20,792 192,287
Peak load 13,480 61,431 26,246 5,021 30,901 10,840 5,449 15,971 169,339
Note: The supply capability includes the power output of relatively small electric utilities such as municipal electric
utilities. Peak load represents the maximum three-day average peak load.
Source: Estimated from METI (2003), FEPC (2002), and others.  
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Table 2. Capacity of Interconnection Transmission Line 
Unit: MW
1234567
(A-B) (B-C) (C-E) (E-D) (E-F) (F-G) (F-H)
Transmission capacity 6,000 1,200 5,570 5,570 16,660 2,400 5,570
Source: METI (2002).  
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-0.007418 -0.001628 -0.003810 -0.019916 -0.003236 -0.009225 -0.018352 -0.006261
Slope of marginal
cost function
0.0005038 0.0001374 0.0002881 0.0013662 0.0002971 0.0006538 0.0010837 0.0005339
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Table 4. Comparison of Cournot and Perfect Competition: Welfare 
Unit: 1,000 yen/h
Cournot competiton Perfect competition
Consumer surplus 7,881,240 8,761,543
Producer surplus 1,657,938 864,748
Congestion revenue 7,711 176
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Table 5. Welfare Changes Due to Upgrading of Transmission Capacity on Line 2 
Unit: 1,000 yen/h
Base case 2,400MW 3,600MW 4,800MW 6,000MW 7,200MW
Consumer surplus 7,881,240 7,887,836 7,895,392 7,905,887 7,916,805 7,928,164
Producer surplus 1,657,938 1,648,621 1,639,515 1,628,259 1,619,205 1,612,334
Congestion revenue 7,711 13,363 17,541 20,995 21,035 17,663
Social surplus 9,546,889 9,549,820 9,552,448 9,555,141 9,557,046 9,558,162 
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Table 6. Welfare Changes Due to Divestiture 
Unit: 1,000 yen/h
Base case Scenario I Scenario II Scenario III Scenario IV Scenario V
Consumer surplus 7,881,240 8,089,235 8,166,766 8,219,693 8,208,371 8,399,704
Producer surplus 1,657,938 1,494,453 1,428,641 1,379,220 1,385,506 1,215,401
Congestion revenue 7,711 1,982 0 65 3,936 0
Social surplus 9,546,889 9,585,670 9,595,407 9,598,977 9,597,812 9,615,105  





























Consumer surplus (1,000 yen/h) Price 12.80 Price 19.23
Producer surplus (1,000 yen/h) Markup 33.0 Markup 57.0
Congestion revenue (1,000 yen/h) Generation 6,794 Generation 17,383
Social surplus (1,000 yen/h) Consumption 4,880 Consumption 12,236
Export 1,914 Export 5,147
Capacity 5,570 Capacity 6,000
4 Flow 1,914 Flow 5,147 1




Price 12.80 7 Price 12.80 Price 12.80 3 Price 12.80 2 Price 19.23
Markup 40.3 Markup 38.3 Markup 49.8 Markup 53.3 Markup 68.7
Generation 17,486 Generation 13,383 5 Generation 25,564 Generation 22,552 Generation 49,415
Consumption 15,523 Capacity 5,570 Consumption 10,536 Consumption 30,035 Capacity 5,570 Consumption 25,511 Capacity 1,200 Consumption 55,762
Export 1,963 Flow 1,963 Export 2,847 Export -4,471 Flow 4,159 Export -2,959 Flow 1,200 Export -6,347




Price 12.80 Price yen/kWh
Markup 46.6 Markup %
Generation 7,203 Generation MW
Consumption 5,296 Consumption MW













Figure 2. Cournot Competition among Eight Incumbent Generators 
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Figure 3. Comparison of Cournot and Perfect Competition: Energy Prices 
 
 

















Figure 4. Comparison of Cournot and Perfect Competition: Quantities Generated 























Figure 5. Price Changes Due to Upgrading of Transmission Capacity on Line 2 
 




Consumer surplus (1,000 yen/h) Price 13.10 Price 18.66
Producer surplus (1,000 yen/h) Markup 34.5 Markup 55.7
Congestion revenue (1,000 yen/h) Generation 6,794 Generation 17,383
Social surplus (1,000 yen/h) Consumption 4,866 Consumption 12,312
Export 1,928 Export 5,071
Capacity 5,570 Capacity 6,000
4 Flow 1,928 Flow 5,071 1




Price 13.10 7 Price 13.10 Price 13.10 3 Price 13.10 2 Price 18.66
Markup 40.6 Markup 39.7 Markup 50.2 Markup 53.6 Markup 68.3
Generation 17,747 Generation 13,383 5 Generation 25,894 Generation 22,885 Generation 48,639
Consumption 15,477 Capacity 5,570 Consumption 10,505 Consumption 29,945 Capacity 5,570 Consumption 25,434 Capacity 2,400 Consumption 56,109
Export 2,270 Flow 2,270 Export 2,878 Export -4,051 Flow 4,949 Export -2,549 Flow 2,400 Export -7,471




Price 13.10 Price yen/kWh
Markup 47.7 Markup %
Generation 7,203 Generation MW
Consumption 5,280 Consumption MW













Figure 6. Upgrading of Capacity on Line 2 to 2,400MW 
 




Consumer surplus (1,000 yen/h) Price 13.33 Price 17.53
Producer surplus (1,000 yen/h) Markup 35.7 Markup 52.9
Congestion revenue (1,000 yen/h) Generation 6,794 Generation 17,383
Social surplus (1,000 yen/h) Consumption 4,854 Consumption 12,465
Export 1,940 Export 4,918
Capacity 5,570 Capacity 6,000
4 Flow 1,940 Flow 4,918 1




Price 13.33 7 Price 13.33 Price 13.33 3 Price 14.37 2 Price 17.53
Markup 40.8 Markup 40.7 Markup 50.5 Markup 54.8 Markup 67.4
Generation 17,952 Generation 13,383 5 Generation 26,153 Generation 24,330 Generation 47,086
Consumption 15,440 Capacity 5,570 Consumption 10,480 Consumption 29,874 Capacity 5,570 Consumption 25,100 Capacity 4,800 Consumption 56,804
Export 2,512 Flow 2,512 Export 2,903 Export -3,720 Flow 5,570 Export -770 Flow 4,800 Export -9,718




Price 13.33 Price yen/kWh
Markup 48.6 Markup %
Generation 7,203 Generation MW
Consumption 5,268 Consumption MW













Figure 7. Upgrading of Capacity on Line 2 to 4,800MW 




Consumer surplus (1,000 yen/h) Price 13.33 Price 16.40
Producer surplus (1,000 yen/h) Markup 35.7 Markup 49.6
Congestion revenue (1,000 yen/h) Generation 6,794 Generation 17,383
Social surplus (1,000 yen/h) Consumption 4,854 Consumption 12,617
Export 1,940 Export 4,766
Capacity 5,570 Capacity 6,000
4 Flow 1,940 Flow 4,766 1




Price 13.33 7 Price 13.33 Price 13.33 3 Price 16.08 2 Price 16.40
Markup 40.8 Markup 40.7 Markup 50.5 Markup 56.1 Markup 66.5
Generation 17,952 Generation 13,383 5 Generation 26,153 Generation 26,281 Generation 45,533
Consumption 15,440 Capacity 5,570 Consumption 10,480 Consumption 29,874 Capacity 5,570 Consumption 24,651 Capacity 7,200 Consumption 57,499
Export 2,512 Flow 2,512 Export 2,903 Export -3,720 Flow 5,570 Export 1,630 Flow 7,200 Export -11,966




Price 13.33 Price yen/kWh
Markup 48.6 Markup %
Generation 7,203 Generation MW
Consumption 5,268 Consumption MW













Figure 8. Upgrading of Capacity on Line 2 to 7,200MW 























Figure 9. Price Changes Due to Divestiture 




Consumer surplus (1,000 yen/h) Price 12.80 Price 14.45
Producer surplus (1,000 yen/h) Markup 33.0 Markup 45.1
Congestion revenue (1,000 yen/h) Generation 6,794 Generation 16,739
Social surplus (1,000 yen/h) Consumption 4,880 Consumption 12,880
Export 1,914 Export 3,860
Capacity 5,570 Capacity 6,000
4 Flow 1,914 Flow 3,860 1




Price 12.80 7 Price 12.80 Price 12.80 3 Price 12.80 2 Price 14.45
Markup 40.3 Markup 38.3 Markup 49.8 Markup 53.3 Markup 54.3
Generation 17,486 Generation 13,383 5 Generation 25,564 Generation 22,552 Generation 53,635
Consumption 15,523 Capacity 5,570 Consumption 10,536 Consumption 30,035 Capacity 5,570 Consumption 25,511 Capacity 1,200 Consumption 58,695
Export 1,963 Flow 1,963 Export 2,847 Export -4,471 Flow 4,159 Export -2,959 Flow 1,200 Export -5,060




Price 12.80 Price yen/kWh
Markup 46.6 Markup %
Generation 7,203 Generation MW
Consumption 5,296 Consumption MW















Figure 10. Divestiture Scenario I 




Consumer surplus (1,000 yen/h) Price 12.79 Price 12.79
Producer surplus (1,000 yen/h) Markup 33.0 Markup 43.9
Congestion revenue (1,000 yen/h) Generation 6,794 Generation 15,216
Social surplus (1,000 yen/h) Consumption 4,881 Consumption 13,104
Export 1,913 Export 2,111
Capacity 5,570 Capacity 6,000
4 Flow 1,913 Flow 2,111 1




Price 12.79 7 Price 12.79 Price 12.79 3 Price 12.79 2 Price 12.79
Markup 40.3 Markup 38.3 Markup 49.8 Markup 53.3 Markup 45.3
Generation 17,473 Generation 13,380 5 Generation 25,547 Generation 22,535 Generation 56,472
Consumption 15,526 Capacity 5,570 Consumption 10,538 Consumption 30,040 Capacity 5,570 Consumption 25,515 Capacity 1,200 Consumption 59,719
Export 1,947 Flow 1,947 Export 2,842 Export -4,493 Flow 4,115 Export -2,980 Flow 1,135 Export -3,247




Price 12.79 Price yen/kWh
Markup 46.5 Markup %
Generation 7,203 Generation MW
Consumption 5,297 Consumption MW















Figure 11. Divestiture Scenario II 
 




Consumer surplus (1,000 yen/h) Price 12.31 Price 12.26
Producer surplus (1,000 yen/h) Markup 30.4 Markup 43.5
Congestion revenue (1,000 yen/h) Generation 6,794 Generation 14,731
Social surplus (1,000 yen/h) Consumption 4,905 Consumption 13,176
Export 1,889 Export 1,555
Capacity 5,570 Capacity 6,000
4 Flow 1,889 Flow 1,555 1




Price 12.31 7 Price 12.31 Price 12.31 3 Price 12.31 2 Price 12.26
Markup 39.8 Markup 37.9 Markup 49.2 Markup 52.8 Markup 39.3
Generation 17,049 Generation 12,997 5 Generation 25,010 Generation 21,993 Generation 59,689
Consumption 15,602 Capacity 5,570 Consumption 10,590 Consumption 30,187 Capacity 5,570 Consumption 25,640 Capacity 1,200 Consumption 60,045
Export 1,448 Flow 1,448 Export 2,407 Export -5,177 Flow 2,447 Export -3,647 Flow -1,200 Export -355




Price 12.31 Price yen/kWh
Markup 44.4 Markup %
Generation 7,203 Generation MW
Consumption 5,323 Consumption MW















Figure 12. Divestiture Scenario III 
 




Consumer surplus (1,000 yen/h) Price 10.96 Price 14.24
Producer surplus (1,000 yen/h) Markup 23.6 Markup 42.0
Congestion revenue (1,000 yen/h) Generation 6,653 Generation 17,383
Social surplus (1,000 yen/h) Consumption 4,973 Consumption 12,908
Export 1,680 Export 4,475
Capacity 5,570 Capacity 6,000
4 Flow 1,680 Flow 4,475 1




Price 10.96 7 Price 10.96 Price 10.96 3 Price 10.96 2 Price 14.24
Markup 38.2 Markup 36.7 Markup 35.2 Markup 38.4 Markup 54.1
Generation 15,852 Generation 11,914 5 Generation 27,845 Generation 25,251 Generation 53,149
Consumption 15,817 Capacity 5,570 Consumption 10,736 Consumption 30,603 Capacity 5,570 Consumption 25,993 Capacity 1,200 Consumption 58,824
Export 35 Flow 35 Export 1,179 Export -2,758 Flow 1,942 Export -742 Flow 1,200 Export -5,675




Price 10.96 Price yen/kWh
Markup 37.6 Markup %
Generation 7,203 Generation MW
Consumption 5,396 Consumption MW
















Figure 13. Divestiture Scenario IV 
 




Consumer surplus (1,000 yen/h) Price 10.61 Price 10.61
Producer surplus (1,000 yen/h) Markup 23.4 Markup 28.7
Congestion revenue (1,000 yen/h) Generation 6,474 Generation 16,011
Social surplus (1,000 yen/h) Consumption 4,990 Consumption 13,397
Export 1,484 Export 2,614
Capacity 5,570 Capacity 6,000
4 Flow 1,484 Flow 2,614 1




Price 10.61 7 Price 10.61 Price 10.61 3 Price 10.61 2 Price 10.61
Markup 37.8 Markup 36.4 Markup 34.8 Markup 38.0 Markup 30.1
Generation 15,540 Generation 11,633 5 Generation 27,255 Generation 24,651 Generation 59,532
Consumption 15,873 Capacity 5,570 Consumption 10,773 Consumption 30,711 Capacity 5,570 Consumption 26,085 Capacity 1,200 Consumption 61,054
Export -332 Flow -332 Export 860 Export -3,457 Flow 342 Export -1,433 Flow -1,092 Export -1,522




Price 10.61 Price yen/kWh
Markup 35.5 Markup %
Generation 7,203 Generation MW
Consumption 5,416 Consumption MW
















Figure 14. Divestiture Scenario V 
 
 